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Recent Decisions
GOVERNMENT LIABILITY-FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
ACT-DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION-The United States
Supreme Court held that the discretionary function exception of
the FTCA will not apply when a federal statute, regulation or pol-
icy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to
follow.
Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988).
On May 10, 1979, at the age of two months, Kevan Berkovitz
ingested a dose of oral polio vaccine, Orimune, manufactured by
Lederle Laboratories.' This dosage caused Kevan to contract a se-
vere case of polio,2 leaving him close to total paralysis and unable
to breath on his own. 3
A suit was filed against the United States in federal district
court by Kevan, joined by his parents as guardians." This com-
plaint was filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act, ("FTCA"), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674,1 alleging that the United States was liable
1. Berkovitz v. United States 108 S.Ct. 1954,1957(1988).
2. Id. The communicable disease control center determined that Kevan contracted
his polio from the vaccine he ingested. Id. at 1957.
3. Id.
4. Id. Lederle Laboratories was also sued by the petitioners in a separate civil ac-
tion, which was settled prior to the filing of this case. Id. at 1955, n. 1 Throughout this Note,
the term petitioners refers to Kevan joined by his parents.
5. 28 U.S.C § 1346(b) entitled "United States as defendant" provides in pertinent
part:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts together with
the United States District Court for the district of the Canal Zone and the District
Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945,
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
28 U.S.C § 2674(1983) entitled "Liability of the United States" states: "The United States
shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the
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for Kevan's injuries because the Division of Biologic Standards
("DBS"),6 had wrongfully issued a license to Lederle Laboratories
to produce Orimune and additionally that the Bureau of Biologics,
a division of the Food and Drug Administration, ("FDA"), "had
acted wrongfully in sanctioning the release of the vaccine lot which
contained Kevan's dose."' 7 Petitioners alleged that the above acts
constituted a violation of federal law and policy regarding the in-
spection and approval of vaccines for polio.
8
The United States moved to have the suit dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction arguing that the alleged actions fell
within the discretionary function exception of the FTCA.9 The mo-
tion to dismiss was denied by the district court stating that neither
the release of a specific lot of vaccine to the public or the licensing
of Orimune was a "discretionary function" included within the
contemplation of the FTCA.1 ° At the request of the government,
the district court certified its decision for immediate appeal to the
Third Circuit," the court of appeals accepted jurisdiction.'2
In reversing the decision of the district court, the court of ap-
peals stated that "the discretionary function exception is inappli-
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but
shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages ..."
6. Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 1957 (1988). At the time that Kevan




The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to- (a)
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the government, exercis-
ing due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute
or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or
an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982).
10. Id.
11. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) provides as follows:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling ques-
tion of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that
an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the termination of liti-
gation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may there-
upon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order: Provided how-
ever, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the
district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall
order.




cable to non-discretionary regulatory actions."'" Although rejecting
the governments argument that all claims arising out of the regula-
tory activities of federal agencies are barred by the discretionary
function exception, the court held that here there could be no basis
for a suit against the government since the licensing and release of
specific lots of vaccine to the public were discretionary acts. 4 The
court relied on United States v. S.A Empresa De Aera Rio
Grandese,'15 ("Varig"), in making their determination that the ap-
proval of the release of the polio vaccine was a discretionary act.'6
Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court, 7 to resolve a con-
flict which had arisen in the circuits regarding the discretionary
function exception in relation to the government's regulation of
polio vaccines.' 8 A unanimous Court reversed the dismissal of the
suit by the court of appeals. 9
Since there was a dismissal in the Court below, the Supreme
Court was presented with the question of whether or not the dis-
missal was proper and if the petitioners suit should be barred by
the discretionary function exception of the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §
2680(a).20
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Marshall noted that the
discretionary function exception "marks the boundary between
Congress' willingness to impose tort liability upon the United
States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities
from exposure to suit by private individuals."'"
The analysis by the Supreme Court began with an examination
of the principles previously laid down by the Supreme Court as
13. Id. (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 822 F.2d 1322, 328 (3d. Cir. 1987)).
14, Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988).
15. 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
16. 108 S.Ct. at 1959 (1988). The court noted that the process used to release polio
vaccines was similar to the "regulatory scheme" used by the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion(FAA) when they spotcheck airplanes for compliance with safety standards. This spot
checking was found to be a discretionary action insulated from liability. Id.
17. 484 U.S. __, 108 S. Ct. 692 (1988).
18. 108 S.Ct. at 1958. Compare Berkovitz v. United States 822 F.2d 1322 (3d
Cir.1987)., holding that the discretionary function exception barred a suit alleging the
wrongful action in the licensing and approval of a specific lot of polio vaccine, with Baker v.
United States, 817 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 2845 (1988), holding that
discretionary function exception did not bar suit alleging a negligent decision to license a
polio vaccine: and Loge v. United States 662 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1981), holding that discre-
tionary function exception did not bar suit alleging negligence in both the licensing of a
polio vaccine and the release of a particular vaccine lot.
19. Berkovitz v. United States 108 S. Ct. 1954, 1956 (1988).
20. Id. See supra note 9.
21. Id., (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797,808 (1984)).
1989
Duquesne Law Review
well as the specific language and legislative history of the discre-
tionary function exception of the FTCA.12 Previously, discretion-
ary action had been viewed as some type of conduct which in-
volved an element of choice, or judgment on the part of an
individual. 23 When an employee is required to follow directives,
regulations or statutes his conduct will not be considered to be dis-
cretionary. 24 If an employee's conduct does not necessitate exercis-
ing any judgment or choice, then there is no discretionary action
designed to be protected by the exception.26 If the alleged wrong
does involve judgment or choice, the inquiry by the court will be to
determine if that specific judgment or choice was the type of action
contemplated to be covered by the discretionary function excep-
tion.2 ". . . [T]he discretionary function exception insulates the
Government from liability if the action challenged in the case in-
volves the permissible exercise of policy judgment. ' 27 The Supreme
Court specifically rejected the argument presented by the Govern-
ment in the courts below, that any and all suits arising out of con-
duct which is based on regulatory programs or federal agencies
should be barred.28
In analyzing the claims against the government set forth by the
petitioners, the court reviewed the process used for both the licen-
sure and release of vaccines used for the prevention of polio.29 The
petitioners' argument was set forth in two main parts. The first
claim alleges that when DBS issued a license to Lederle Laborato-
ries to produce the Orimune vaccine it violated a federal statute
22. 108 S. Ct. at 1958.
23. Id. at 1959.
24. Id. See, Dalehite v. United States 346 U.S. 15 (1953), which stated that the ex-
ception protects "the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to
one's judgment of the best course .. " Id. at 34.
25. Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 1959 (1988).
26. Id. See also Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988) which recognized that conduct
prescribed by law cannot be discretionary.
27. 108 S. Ct. at 1959.
28. Id. The court cited Varig as showing where the discretionary function exception
bars a claim involving policy. Id. In Varig, there were tort claims which arose out of airline
accidents. The victims of these accidents alleged that the FAA had been negligent in certify-
ing specific planes to fly. The court held that the decision by the FAA to certify the planes
the way they did was a discretionary act protected from liability claims. They also noted
that the"spot-checking" program developed to enforce safety standard compliance was also
a policy determination, discretionary in nature,which insulated the employees who adminis-
tered the program from liability. S.A. Empresa De Viacco Aera Rio Grandese v. United
States, 467 U.S. 797, 815-16 (1984).
29. Berkovitz v. United States 1954, 1961 (1988).
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and a federal regulation. 0 In order to market a live polio vaccine a
manufacturer must first receive a product license as required by
federal law.31 In order to be eligible for a license, the manufacturer
must first provide a sample of the product.32 The manufacturer
must then administer tests which measure the safety of the prod-
uct at various times in the course of manufacturing the product.33
When finished with this testing process, the manufacturer must
submit a product license application to DBS along with the exe-
cuted test results and a final sample of the vaccine.34 When making
the decision to issue a product license, DBS must follow the guide-
lines set up by the various regulatory and statutory provisions. s5
The petitioners' claim alleges that DBS licensed Orimune with-
out first receiving the necessary test data indicating that the prod-
uct complied with safety standards.3 " Issuing a license without the
necessary test data would be a violation of specific regulatory and
statutory provisions.3 7 Justice Marshall, in applying this allegation
to the discretionary function exception, held that the petitioners
claim would not be barred since the receipt of the test data on the
30. Id. at 1960.
31. Id. at 1961, See 58 Stat. 702, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 262(d) (1983), which dis-
cusses the licensing of biological products.
32. 108 S. Ct. at 1961. To obtain a sample product the manufacturer obtains an origi-
nal virus strain. From this, he then grows a seed virus from the strain which is used to
produce monopools, from which portions are taken from the product that is used by the
consumer for vaccination. The safety criteria for this process is set forth by several regula-
tions for the production of the strain of the original vaccine: 42 C.F.R. 73.110(b)(2) (Supp.
1964); 21 C.F.R. § 630.10 (b)(3)(4) (1987), and the vaccine monopools, 42 C.F.R.§ 73.114
(Supp. 1964); 21 C.F.R. § 630.16 (1987).
33. 108 S. Ct. at 1961. Lederle laboratories was issued a license by DBS to produce
Orrimune in 1963. Throughout the footnotes the first C.F.R. regulation referred to is the
regulation in effect at the time Orimune was licensed. If the current regulation is substan-
tially the same, the parallel cite is given to the current regulation. Id. n.7
34. Id. at 1961. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 73.110,73.114 (Supp.1964); 21 C.F.R. § 630.16 (1987).
35. Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 1962. See 42 C.F.R. § 73.3
(Supp.1964); 21 C.F.R. § 601.2(1987) for licensure; 42 C.F.R. §73.3 (Supp.1964); 21 C.F.R. §
601.2 (1987) for test and product sample.
36. 108 S.Ct. at 1960-61. DBS issued a license to Lederle Laboratories for the produc-
tion of Orimune in 1963. Id. n.7 at 1961.
37. 108 S. Ct. at 1961. 42 U.S.C. § 262(d) of the Public Health Service Act provides
that:
Licenses for the maintenance of establishments for the propagation or manufacture
and preparation of products [including polio vaccines] may be issued only upon show-
ing that the establishment and the products for which a license is desired meet stan-
dards, designed to insure the continued safety, purity, and potency of such products,
prescribed in regulations, and licenses for new products may be issued only upon a
showing that they meet such standards. All such licenses shall be issued, suspended,
and revoked as prescribed by regulations. . ..
42 U.S.C. § 262(d) (1983).
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vaccine is a prerequisite to issuing a license. 8 DBS does not have
discretionary powers in the area of issuing a license because this
process is covered by specific statutes.39 The court concluded that
the first theory on which petitioners' based their claim imposes no
bar to a suit against the government under the FTCA.4°
The second part of petitioners' argument, which also refers to
the licensing of Orimune, was not set forth in a clear and concise
manner.41 The alleged misconduct revolves around the Orimune
being licensed even though it failed to meet regulatory safety stan-
dards.42 The court saw this argument as proceeding in any of three
ways, depending upon the facts presented.43 In order to properly
analyze when the discretionary function exception would and
would not apply, the court analyzed the three possible meanings of
petitioners' claim and how each possibility would be seen under
the discretionary function exception clause of the FTCA.44
If the allegation is construed to mean that DBS licensed
Orimune when they: 1) knew it failed to comply with regulatory
standards, or 2) never determined if the vaccine was in compliance;
the discretionary function exception would not bar this suit.45 The
court reasoned that these allegations would fall under the regula-
tions set forth for licensing polio vaccines and these regulations
specifically state that a license may not be issued without examin-
ing the product to be licensed and finding that it complies with all
standards set forth in applicable regulations.4" The second part of
the claim by petitioners addresses the liability of the government
when an agency ignores a duty imposed by law.47 The court held
that, "[wihen a suit charges an agency with failing to act in accord
with a specific mandatory directive, the discretionary exception
38. 38. Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 1961 (1988).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1962. See supra, note 34 and 42 C.F.R. § 73.3 (Supp.1964); 21 C.F.R. §
601.2 (1987), providing that an application for licensure shall be deemed as filed only upon
receipt of relevant test data.
41. Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1954 at 1964 "Petitioner's other allegation
regarding the licensing of Orimune is difficult to describe with precision. . . . Neither peti-
tioner's complaint nor their briefs and argument before this Court make entirely clear their






47. Id. See 42 C.F.R. § 73.5(a) (Supp. 1964); 21 C.F.R. § 601.4 (1987).
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does not apply." 8
If the second part of the petitioners' claim is interpreted as
meaning that DBS incorrectly found that Orimune complied with
regulatory standards, then the court's decision turns on a different
analysis of the issue.4 9 If the policy, which guides the determina-
tion of assessing compliance with regulatory standards, involves
judgment on the part of the agency it may be insulated from liabil-
ity under the discretionary function exception." The issue of
whether or not the policy involved is a permissible exercise of pol-
icy choice could not decided by the Supreme Court due to lack of
necessary factual information regarding this claim, and will have to
be decided by the District Court if this particular claim is pursued
by the petitioners' on remand.51 Since petitioners' claim has two
prongs it is important to note that there are different regulations
for the issuing of a license, and the distribution of that product to
the public. The release for distribution places a burden on the
manufacturer, and not the Bureau of Biologics, ("Bureau"), to in-
spect lots that will be distributed to the public for compliance with
regulations.5 2 The Bureau is allowed to determine the proper way
in which to regulate the release of the vaccine much the same way
that the FAA regulated the airplanes in Varig 3 Any claim which
attempts to challenge the policy set forth by the Bureau of Bio-
logics in regulating the release of vaccines, will be held to be
barred under the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. 5
Any similar claim, attempting to hold individual employees liable,
will be barred if the policies set forth by the Bureau allow for pol-
icy judgments to be made by employees on an individual basis.5 5 If
the Bureau policies do not allow an employee to exercise his/her
own judgment, and thus not use any discretion, the petitioners'
48. Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 1963 (1988). The government con-
ceded at oral argument that the DBS has no discretion to issue a product license without an





52. Id. See 21 C.F.R. § 610.1 (1978). This is the regulation in effect when Lederle
Laboratories released the lot of vaccine which injured Kevan. The current regulations
are basically the same and have the same citation. Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S. Ct.
1954, 1961 n. 12.
53. Id. at 1964.
54. Id. See supra, note 25.
55. Id. at 1964.
1989
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claim would not be barred.5 Petitioners' second claim should not
have been dismissed since they allege that there was a policy in
effect at the time the vaccine was released, and that the Bureau
would test all vaccines to make sure they were in compliance with
set safety standards, and forbid the distribution of any specific lot
which failed the testing. 7 In sum, the Supreme Court concluded
that petitioners' claim against the government should not have
been dismissed since the alleged acts which caused injury to Kevan
could be seen as involving acts that were not discretionary in na-
ture but a result of following set policies which did not involve a
permissible exercise of policy discretion, or in the alternative, regu-
lations that mandate specific actions on the part of governmental
agencies. 58 The factual allegations will have to be proven upon re-
mand to the lower court in accordance with the findings set forth
by the Supreme Court.5 9 In order to prevail upon remand, petition-
ers will have to prove that the actions which caused the harm to
Kevan, fall within the parameters set down by the Supreme Court
as an activity which does not fall into the discretionary function
exception of the FTCA.
The justices, in formulating their decision in Berkovitz, took into
account both the history of the FTCA as well as the case law that
developed around the discretionary function exception.
To understand the FTCA it is necessary to understand the way
in which this act evolved. The "King can do no wrong" 0 was the
prevalent view when the United States began as a country.6 ' Under
this English common law theory of sovereign immunity, suit
against the government and its employees for any negligent acts
56. Id. Cf. Varig v. United States, 467 U.S. 797, at 820 (1984), which held that negli-
gent policy judgment regarding the proper inspection of planes on the part of FAA
employees, is barred by the discretionary function exception.
57. Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 1964 (1988). See also Indian Towing
Company v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955) which held that a negligent failure to
maintain a lighthouse in good working order was not barred, even though the decision to
maintain the lighthouse service was a discretionary policy judgment.
58. 108 S.Ct. 1954 at 1964 (1988).
59. Id. at 1965.
60. 3 W. Holdworth, A History of English Common Law, 458-69 (5th ed. 1942). This
idea came into being from the concept that the king was infallible and to allow the subjects
of the king to sue him in his court would contradict this infallibility. Id.
61. In the case of Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), the United
States adopted this theory of sovereign immunity. The court stated that according to the
Constitution "a state [could] never be subjected, at the suit of any individual, to any judicial
tribunal, without its own consent; for it can never be made a party defendant in any case,
or by any party, except in cases between it, and another state, or a foreign state." Id. at 308.
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was barred.2 In 1855 the United States Government began taking
the first steps toward allowing itself to be sued by establishing the
Court of Claims."3 In response to an extremely high number of pri-
vate bills in the Court of Claims, against the United States, Con-
gress considered and enacted the FTCA in 1946.64
The FTCA was enacted to relieve Congress of the task of consid-
ering all the private relief bills and to give the courts the role of
considering these bills. 5 The FTCA was enacted as part of the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, with a purpose of "[provid-
ing] for increased efficiency in the legislative branch of the Govern-
ment."66 While doing away with the concept of sovereign immu-
nity, the enactment of the FTCA did not constitute a waiver of all
rights on the part of the United States Government in suits
brought against them.
Section 2680 of the FTCA, referred to as the discretionary func-
tion exception, is just one example an the area where the govern-
ment has shielded itself from liability. The inclusion of this excep-
tion in the FTCA was seen as a way of protecting the Government
from liability in tort for acts which are the result of errors in dis-
cretionary functions and administration.6 7 As an Assistant Attor-
62. Id. " a state [could] never be subjected, at the suit of any individual, to any
judicial tribunal, without it's own consent..." Id.
63. Ch. 22. 10 Stat. 612 (1855) This was an advisory body which heard claims and
then would prepare a bill which awarded what they considered to be just compensation.
This bill was then presented to Congress who had the choice of enacting it into law or doing
nothing about the bill. Baer, Suing Uncle Sam in Tort, 26 N.C.L. REV. 119 (1947) For fur-
ther information regarding the evolution of the Court of Claims See: Baer, Suing Uncle
Sam in Tort, 26 N.C.L. REV. 119 (1947).
64. See H.R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Congress., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE
AND CONG. & AD. NEWS 807 (which discusses the policy and goals of the FTCA). In the 77th
Congress, 1,829 private bills were introduced into Congress and 593 were approved. The
total amount of compensation was approximately a little over one million dollars. Id. In the
70th Congress, 2,268 bill were introduced, $562 million was paid out in tort claims, and 336
of the bills were approved. Id. See also; Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception
and the Federal Tort Claims Act. 57 GEO. L. J. 81 n. 5 (1968) (the author suggests that the
private bill system was unresponsive to the needs of the claimants and was also very
cumbersome.).
65. Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d. 990, 995 (10th Cir. 1975) (Discussing the legis-
lative history of the FTCA).
66. Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
67. An Assistant Attorney General explained to the congressional committee that the
purpose of § 2680(a) was to avoid the possibility that courts would authorize suits against
the United States for the negligent performance of legally authorized activities, on the basis
that a private individual would be liable for the same actions. "It was not intended that the
constitutionality of legislation, the legality of regulations, or the propriety of a discretionary
administrative act, should be tested through the medium of a damage suit for tort." Hear-
ings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong.,
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ney General said when giving testimony before the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, the exception was "designed to preclude
application of the bill to a claim against a regulatory agency, such
as the Federal Trade Commission, or the Securities and Exchange
Commission, based upon alleged abuse of discretionary authority
by an officer or employee." "
The term "discretionary" was not defined when the FTCA was
enacted. 9 Congress' failure to define discretionary, coupled with
limited legislative history, regarding what is and is not discretion-
ary, has resulted in the courts having to determine when the dis-
cretionary function exception is to be applied.
Although the FTCA and the discretionary function exception
have been in place since 1946, the first time the Supreme Court
addressed the application of § 2680 to an action under the FTCA
was in Dalehite v. United States.70 The government was sued as a
result of an explosion in the port of Texas City, Texas which lev-
eled the city and killed and injured numerous people.7' Fertilizer
had been loaded onto two ships for shipment to Europe under a
program created by the United States to increase the supply of
food under post-war military occupation. "[F]ertilizer had been
produced and distributed at the instance, according to the specifi-
cations and under control of the United States. '72 The fertilizer
was sold to the French government and loaded onto the ships by
independent stevedores who were hired by the French govern-
ment.73 No single individual act of negligence being shown, the pe-
titioners based their claim on the fact that the United States Gov-
ernment "had brought liability on itself for the catastrophe by
2d Sess. 6, 25, 33 (1942) also cited in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 27 (1953).
68. Downs v. United States, 522 F. 2d 990, 996 (10th Cir. 1975).
69. Included in the FTCA as defined terms are: "Federal Agency", "employee of the
Government" and "acting within the scope of his office or employment." 28 U.S.C. § 2671
(1982). See also, Jayson, Application of the Discretionary Function Exception, 24 FED BAR.
J. 153, 155-56 (1964).
70. 346 U.S. 15, (1958). The Supreme Court did address the FTCA prior to 1953
however, this was the first case dealing specifically with the interpretation of § 2680. Prior
to Dalehite the courts usually interpreted the FTCA liberally, which prevented the court's
from interpreting something which Congress left unclear. See Feres v. United States, 340
U.S. 135, 139-40 (1950) and United States v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 338 U.S. 135,
383 (1949).
71. 346 U.S. 15 (1958). The petitioners sought damages for the death of Henry G.
Dalehite who died in an explosion of fertilizer with an ammonia nitrate base. This case is
referred to as a "test case"by Justice Reed representing 300 separate personal and property
claims in the aggregate amount of two hundred million dollars. Id. at 17.
72. Id. at 18.
73. Id. at 22.
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using a material in fertilizer which had been used a an ingredient
of explosives for so long that industry knowledge gave notice that
other combinations of ammonia nitrate with other material might
explode." '74 In a four-three decision the Court held that the govern-
ment was not liable to the petitioners and the activities upon
which the petitioners wished to place liability on the United States
Government falls within the exception of § 2680.11
The Court first discussed the legislative history of the FTCA.7 6
Their next inquiry was into the interpretation of the Act itself.
They reiterated the standard that an action against the govern-
ment will only lie where it has been authorized by the legislature."
The Court, while defining the activity as discretionary in this par-
ticular case, did not specifically define discretionarys7 The Court
did not totally avoid the issue of what is to be considered a discre-
tionary activity, rather they sat forth some guidelines to be used in
deciding if an activity is discretionary. A discretionary duty or act
upon which a person may sue the government is
more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determi-
nations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifi-
cations or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment
and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordi-
nates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with offi-
cial direction cannot be actionable ... 79
Having given a fairly broad and sweeping definition of discretion
the Court then offered a test to be applied when dealing with sec-
tion 2680. Their test involves defining the activity as either falling
into the category of, "operational activities" of the government,
which would not be barred by § 2680 and "planning" level activi-
ties which would be barred from suit under § 2680.80 In applying
this test to the case before them, the Court found that the actions
74. Id. at 23. The specific charge of negligence was that the United States had
shipped or allowed shipment of Fertilizer Grade Ammonium Nitrate, ("FGAN"), into a con-
gested area without first investigating the properties of FGAN, and without warning of a
possible explosion under certain circumstances. Id.
75. Id. at 47.
76. Id. at 24.
77. Id. at 30.
78. The court said "it is unnecessary to define, apart from this case, precisely where
discretion ends." Id. at 35.
79. Id. at 34-35 The court said that if the exception was not seen this way its objec-
tive would fail when it was most needed. ". . .[W]hen a subordinate performs or fails to
perform a causal step, each action or nonaction being directed by the superior, exercising,
perhaps abusing discretion." Id. at 36.
80. Id. at 37-42.
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of manufacturing, packaging, and transporting the fertilizer as well
as the actual program itself were all "planning" activities immune
from suit under the FTCA 1
The next case to challenge the government's immunity under the
discretionary function exception was, Indian Towing v. United
States."2 A ship, which relied on a lighthouse set up by the govern-
ment, ran aground due to the lighthouse being improperly lit.83
The owner of the ship and the insurance company alleged that
Coast Guard personnel were negligent in their responsibility to
properly maintain the lighthouse and thus the government should
be held liable for damages under the FTCA 4 A 5-4 decision found
that the government would be liable if the negligent acts of the
Coast Guard caused the damage to the ship and its cargo.8 5 The
Court focused its reasoning on the language of § 2674 (and that
implied in § 2680), which places liability on the government "in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances .. ."" The government focused it's ar-
gument on it's reading of the FTCA and determined that it meant
that the government could not be liable in this case because the
maintenance and upkeep of a lighthouse is a "uniquely governmen-
tal functio[n]" and since a private person could not perform this
duty, the government should not be liable. 7 The Supreme Court
did not agree with the government's interpretation of the FTCA
and said that once the government made a decision to provide a
service, even though that decision itself may be discretionary, it
must provide the service with due care.88
81. Id. All the acts were made at the "planning" level and not an "operational" level.
These activities included: selecting the coating for the fertilizer which made the probability
of explosion high; putting the fertilizer in paper bags which were subject to tearing and
flammable; putting the fertilizer in the bags at a high temperature; packing the fertilizer in
a way which did not encourage cooling; and not labeling the bags as a fire hazard and as a
dangerous explosive. Id.
82. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
83. Id. at 62.
84. Id. at 61- 2."[F]ailure of the responsible Coast Guard personnel to check the bat-
tery and sun relay system which operated the light; the failure . . . to make a proper exami-
nation of the connections which were 'out in the weather'; the failure to check the light
between September 7 and October 1, 1951; and the failure to repair the light or give warning
that the light was not operating." Id. at 62.
85. Id. at 69.
86. Id. at 64-64.
87. Id.
88. Id. 68-69. The court pointed out that "it is hornbook tort law that one who un-
dertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby induces reliance must perform his 'good
Samaritan' task in a careful manner. " Id. 64-65. The court also noted that the purpose of
172 Vol. 28:161
Recent Decision
The government was held liable under the theory that the activ-
ity involved was one which took place at the "operational" level,
thus subjecting the government to liability.89 The Court did not
overrule Dalehite but distinguished this case from it, stating
that"[t]he differences between this case and Dalehite need not be
labored. The governing factors in Dalehite sufficiently emerge from
the opinion in that case." 90
Two years later, in Rayonier, Inc., v. United States, 91 another
case was brought before the Supreme Court under the discretion-
ary function exception of the FTCA. Two cases were brought by
individuals seeking damages which they alleged were caused by the
negligence of Forest Service employees in letting a fire start on
government land and in failing to use due care to put that fire
out.2 Faced with determining if the government would be immune
from liability for the negligence of these employees, the Court reaf-
firmed its finding in Indian Towing that the government is not
shielded from liability simply because the acts in question are
"uniquely governmental."93 Using the same reasoning and test set
forth in Indian Towing,9" Justice Black stated that a person can-
not be deprived of his or her rights under the FTCA ". . . by re-
sort to any alleged distinction, imported from the law of municipal
corporations, between the Government's negligence when it acts in
a 'proprietary' capacity and its negligence when it acts in a
'uniquely governmental' capacity.""0 The Court made it clear that
when the FTCA was established the government knew that the
treasury would be affected by meritorious claims, but that it is
more equitable for the loss to be spread amongst all who benefit
from government services than to impose a burden on the person
who as been harmed. 6 The Supreme Court should not put in any
other exemptions to the FTCA than those already established by
the FTCA was to give compensation to victims of negligent acts under the same circum-
stances a private person would be liable,"and not to leave just treatment to the caprice and
legislative burden of individual private bill laws." Id. at 68-69.
89. Id. at 64-65, (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S.15, 42 (1953)).
90. Id. at 69. (footnote omitted) Justice Reed, who wrote the opinion in Dalehite, was
joined by three other Justices in a dissent. Id. at 70-76.
91. 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
92. Id .at 315.
93. Id. at 318-19.
94. Id. at 315-16. "...the test established by the Tort Claims Act for determining
the United States liability is whether a private person would be responsible for similar neg-
ligence under the laws of the State where the acts occurred. Id. at 319.
95. Id. at 319.
96. Id. at 320.
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Congress.9 7 Again Justice Reed dissented, along with Justice Clark
feeling that the issue of liability for fighting fires was well settled
in Dalehite. 98
The last time the Supreme Court addressed this issue prior to
Berkovitz"9 was in Varig.100 In a unanimous opinion, written by
Chief Justice Burger, the Court was faced with the question of
whether or not the United States could be held liable for the negli-
gence of the Federal Aviation Administration, ("FAA"), in their
failure to properly inspect two aircraft for safety and fire hazards
before certifying the planes which were to be used in commercial
aviation. 0 1 In answering the question in the negative, the Court
held that the discretionary function exception applied to all negli-
gent acts of the FAA in inspecting and certifying aircraft. °2
Varig was the consolidation of two cases from the Ninth Circuit
in which the government was held liable under the California
"Good Samaritan" rule and the defense of the discretionary func-
tion exception of the FTCA was rejected.103 The alleged negligence
in the two cases involved the inspection and certification of aircraft
by the FAA.' °4
In Varig, the negligence complained of was that the plane, which
crashed, was inspected and issued a certificate even though the
towel disposal area, where the fire started, was not in compliance
with the fire safety standard.10 5 In the companion case, United
States v. Scottish Insurance Company, the plane was issued a
supplemental type certificate, which certified that the plane met
all airworthiness standards, after the installation of a gasoline
97. Id. Justice Black placed the burden of changing any of exemptions of the FTCA
on Congress, who originally adopted the Act. Id.
98. Id. at 321.
99. 108 S.Ct. 1954 (1988).
100. 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 821.
103. 467 U.S. 797, 801-03 In Varig, a fire started in the lavatory of a commercial jet
owned by Varig Airlines in flight between Rio de Janeiro to Paris. In spite of the fact that
the crew was able to land the plane, 125 out of 135 people on board died from asphyxiation
or the toxic gases produced from the fire. Most of the plane was destroyed. Id. at 800. The
other case was United States v. Scottish Insurance Co., 467 U.S. 797 (1984). In Scottish, an
aircraft used in an air taxi service caught fire, burned, and crashed near Las Vegas, Nevada.
The cause of the crash was a fire in the forward baggage compartment. Id. at 802.
104. Id. at 801-03.
105. Id. at 801. See, 14 C.F.R. § 4b.381(d)(1956) which requires that waste receptacles




burning cabin heater.' °6 The cause of the crash was found to have
resulted from certain defects in the installation of gas lines in the
cabin heater and that the installation of this heater did not comply
with FAA regulations.
10 7
In analyzing the claims of negligence and the possible applica-
tion of the discretionary function exception, the Court first made a
detailed examination of the FAA and the regulations under its au-
thority.' The regulations make "the applicant itself responsible
for conducting all inspections and tests necessary to determine
that the aircraft comports with FAA airworthiness
requirements. "109
The next step in their analysis was the same step taken in previ-
ous cases dealing with the discretionary function exception: an ex-
amination of the legislative history and phrasing of the FTCA and
specifically § 2680(a)." 0 In examining the legislative history, the
Court noted with interest the testimony of a government spokes-
man who appeared before the House Committee on the Judiciary
describing § 2680(a) as a " highly important exception."
[It is] designed to preclude application of the act to a claim based upon an
alleged abuse of discretionary authority by a regulatory or licensing agency
... it is neither desirable nor intended that the constitutionality of legisla-
tion, the legality of regulations, or the propriety of a discretionary adminis-
trative act should be tested through the medium of a damage suit for
tort . .
The Court next discussed cases which have previously dealt with
the discretionary function exception and noted that the "[c]ourt's
reading of the Act admittedly has not followed a straight line, we
do not accept the supposition that Dalehite no longer represents a
valid interpretation of the discretionary function exception.""' 2 In-
dian Towing should not be taken as a repudiation of the views set
forth in Dalehite regarding § 2680(a)." 3
106. Varig v. United States, 467 U.S. 797, 802 (1984). Any person who alters an air-
craft by introducing a major change in the type design must obtain from the FAA a supple-
mental type certificate. 14 C.F.R. § 21.113 (1983). In order to obtain such a certificate, the
applicant must supply the FAA with drawings, plans, and other data sufficient to establish
that the altered aircraft meets all applicable airworthiness requirements 14 C.F.R. § 21.115
(1983).
107. 467 U.S. at 803.
108. Id. at 804-07.
109. Id. at 805, (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.33, 21.35 (1983)).
110. 467 U.S. at 807-10.
111. Id. at 809-10.
112. Id. at 811-12.
113. Id. at 812-13.
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The Supreme Court, recognizing the impossibility of outlining
the fine lines and boundaries of the discretionary function excep-
tion, set forth guidelines to be used when applying § 2680(a).
1 14
The first step is to assess "the nature of the conduct, rather than
the status of the actor." Second, the Court must look to see if the
acts of the government employees are of the nature and quality
that Congress intended to shield from liability. 115 The discretion-
ary function exception "plainly was intended to encompass the dis-
cretionary acts of the Government acting in its role as a regulator
of the conduct of private individuals.
'"" 6
Using the guidelines set forth by the Court, they then examined
the FAA certification process used in the two cases on review. The
Secretary of Transportation had a duty to "promote safety in air
transportation by promulgating reasonable rules and regulations
governing the inspection,, servicing and overhaul of civil air-
craft.""' 7 The statute authorizing this allowed the Secretary to use
her discretion in achieving a goal of promoting air safety. 18 The
Secretary formulated a system which placed the responsibility for
compliance with the FAA regulations on the manufacturer and the
operator." 9 The FAA retained the duty of policing the compliance
with regulations. 2 ° This policing was done by a "spot check" sys-
tem set up by the Secretary.' 2 '
The Court held that this "spot check" system was discretionary
and of "the 'nature and quality' protected by § 2680(a)." ' 2  It also
stressed that "[w]hen an agency determines the extent to which it
will supervise the safety procedures of private individuals, it is ex-
ercising discretionary regulatory authority of the most basic
kind."
2 3
114. Id. at 813.
115. Id. (Emphasis added).
116. Id. 813-14.
117. Id. at 816, (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(3)(A)(1983)).
118. Id. at 816-17. The Secretary may also prescribe "the periods for, and the manner
in, which such inspection, servicing, and overhaul shall be made, including provision for
examinations and reports by properly qualified private persons.... ".49 U.S.C.
1421(a)(3)(C)(1983).
119. 467 U.S. 797, 816-17.
120. Id.
121. Id. A manufacturer is required to develop plans and specifications as well as per-
form the necessary test to make sure that the plane is in compliance with the regulations.
Upon completing these steps, the FAA's method of review is through "spot checks" on the
manufacturer's work. Id. at 816-17.
122. Id. at 819.
123. Id. at 819-20.
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In stating their holding, the Court again stressed the legislative
intent of § 2680(a) and made it clear that the duty on the part of
the FAA was to "promote safety in air transportation, not to in-
sure it."'24
The three leading cases in which the Supreme Court reviewed
the discretionary function exception, 2 5 prior to Berkovitz, set the
framework for the boundaries of the discretionary function excep-
tion. These decisions have been consistent in relying on both the
language of the statute and the intent of Congress as discovered
through the legislative history of the FTCA. The Supreme Court,
through the years, has not made a significant departure from the
views first expressed in 1953 when they were first confronted with
applying the discretionary function exception in Dalehite.126 Al-
though the route from Dalehite127 to Berkovitz128 has not been
straight and concise in setting down clear criteria for what is dis-
cretionary, the general understanding of what will be actionable
under the FTCA has remained the same throughout the years and
there has been no increase in the scope of liability under the dis-
cretionary function exception of the FTCA.
Since the Court did not have to specifically address the liability
of the government in this case, they were able to set up guidelines
to be used in cases arising under the discretionary function excep-
tion of the FTCA. In setting these guidelines, the Court seized an
opportunity to make clear any discrepancies that may have arisen
from previous cases, as well as ambiguities which arose due to the
lack of a specific definition of the term "discretionary.' ' 29 Not only
has the Court clarified its interpretation of the statutes in ques-
tion, it has also used this case to give possible interpretations of
what in the future will and will not be considered discretionary,
especially in the petitioners' present case."'
124. Id. at 821. (Emphasis in original).
125. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).; Indian Towing v. United States,
350 U.S. 61 (1955) and United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
126. 346 U.S. 15, (1953).
127. Id.
128. 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988).
129. The term "discretionary" was not defined when the FTCA was enacted. See
supra, note 67 and accompanying text discussing terms which were defined.
130. This is evidenced by the way in which the court takes the petitioners' claim re-
garding the licensing of Orimune, and tries to clarify exactly what the petitioners' are trying
to assert. In doing this, the court gives examples of what will and will not be considered




The Court in Berkovitz"'5 does not create any new areas of lia-
bility for the government; rather it further defines what is a discre-
tionary act for purposes of the discretionary function exception of
the FTCA. This Court's definition of discretionary does not depart
from the previous doctrine set down by it, rather this Court at-
tempts to define the boundaries of the discretionary function ex-
ception. The Court firmly rejects setting down any blanket rule
which would preclude recovery by an individual because the action
which has caused the injury arises out of a regulatory program
sponsored by a federal agency."' 2 This is on point with both
Varig35 and Dalehite,5 which have been consistently cited as the
leading cases concerning the discretionary function exception.
Both of these cases agree that an action by a regulatory agency can
be considered non-discretionary when the conduct does not involve
any judgment or choice on the part of an individual. This is consis-
tent with what an average person would see as a non-discretionary
activity. If an employee is told, either verbally or by a regulation/
statute, to perform a specific task, there is no individual choice or
judgment involved. The assigned task must be done in accordance
with the instructions. If it is proven that DBS ignored specific reg-
ulations in the licensing process of Orimune, a reasonable person
would understand this to indicate nonconformance with regula-
tions and non-discretionary. If an employee ignores specific regula-
tions, laws, statutes or policies, it is perfectly understandable that
the government should be held liable. If no liability is attached,
agencies will be able to hide behind these regulations, statutes and
policies and possibly cut corners because they believe that they
have an absolute defense for their actions simply because their
conduct is furthering a governmental regulatory scheme.
It is evident that the Supreme Court does not want to open the
government up to an avalanche of suits for actions which clearly
involve a matter of choice or judgment and which are based on
considerations of public policy. To open up these avenues would
clearly not only overload the courts with tort actions, but may also
cause agencies, such as the Federal Drug Administration, to be
overly cautious in their activities for fear of a law suit. Putting this
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1960-61. The Court states that this type of argument is rebutted not only
by the actual language of the FTCA but also by the legislative history which shows that only
"discretionary" acts are shielded from liability. Id.
133. 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
134. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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type of fear into the minds of people who are working on new vac-
cines and possible medical cures could bring a dramatic halt to ad-
vances in the area of health care. At the same time, agencies
charged with specific duties and obligations to the public at large
cannot be shielded from liability when they clearly act in a manner
which is opposite to what they have been mandated to do. The
FTCA set the initial parameters of liability for the federal govern-
ment, if those parameters are to be expanded, it is the duty of the
legislative branch to amend the FTCA.3 5
Kevan Berkovitz was severely injured by a vaccine and if he is
able to prove that his injury was caused by a person or an agency
not following a specific regulation he will be able to recover for his
injury. This will fall squarely in line with the intent of the
FTCA.
136
Rather than opening up any new avenues of liability for the gov-
ernment, the court is content to streamline and clarify the bounda-
ries of the FTCA which can only help both regulatory agencies and
potential plaintiffs.
Elizabeth L. Foster-Nolan
135. Although Congress has not amended the FTCA they did, in 1986, enact the Na-
tional Childhood Vaccine Injury Act which limits the liability of manufactures . The extent
of the liability is unclear, but the Act sets up a public insurance program which will benefit
the victims of either fatal or debilitating vaccine reactions. In addition to the compensation
for the victims, the Act also seeks to improve and strengthen the regulation of vaccines by
the Department of Health and Human Services. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986, Title III of Pub. L. 99-660.
136. On remand from the Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings. Berkovitz v.
United States, 858 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1988).
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